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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper proposes that rival firms not only search for new capabilities within their 
organization, but also for those that rest in their competitive environment. An 
integrated analysis of these search processes at both firm and industry levels of 
analysis shows how their interaction makes industries and firms coevolve over time. 
To contribute to an enhanced understanding of the concept of coevolution, a dynamic 
and integrative framework crossing meso and micro levels of analysis is constructed. 
This framework is applied to a longitudinal study of the music industry with a time-
span of 120 years. The first part, a historical study, covers the period 1877 – 1990. 
The second part, a multiple-case study, covers the period 1990 – 1997. We conclude 
that search behavior drives coevolution through competitive dynamics among new 
entrants and incumbent firms and manifests itself in the simultaneous emergence of 
new business models and new organizational forms.  
 
Descriptors: coevolution, search behavior, capabilities, competitive regimes, 
multilevel research, strategic renewal 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Schumpeter (1934) claimed that industrial growth and development is a direct product 
of the competitive process. It is ‘a force from within’ because discovery is determined 
by the things that people in organizations do. Although firms disrupt current methods 
when they force themselves upon their rivals through innovative behavior, they bring 
new ideas and practices to an industry, triggering its further development. This paper 
builds on such a perspective and investigates the relationship between capabilities and 
competition. This is consistent with Henderson and Mitchell (1997), who called for an 
enhanced understanding of the endogenous and reciprocal relationships between 
capabilities and competition. They argued that organizational capabilities shape the 
competitive environment, a process that, in turn, further shapes capability 
development. These interactions cross multiple levels of analysis and make 
capabilities and competition coevolve over time. 
 McKelvey (1997: 360) also argues that the development of capabilities at the 
firm level is both a cause and an effect of the competitive process at the industry 
level. In his explanation that “coevolutionary effects take place at multiple levels”, 
McKelvey (1997: 360) stressed the need for this compound approach to the dynamics 
within and between firms. He maintained that reciprocal relationships between firms 
in a competitive environment are coevolutionary in nature and that such a 
coevolutionary perspective allows for the mutual inclusion of seemingly contradictory 
assumptions in social science that organizations are either idiosyncratic or uniform in 
nature. McKelvey (1997: 356) expressed the latter dilemma as one in which “it seems 
impossible to simultaneously accept the existence of idiosyncratic organizational 
events while at the same time pursuing the essential elements of justification logic.” 
 It is clear that the coevolution concept has the potential to integrate the 
discordance between Schumpeterian streams of ideas and those of the resource-based 
view. Whereas Schumpeterian theory suggests that firms will converge in their 
appearance and behavior (as the dynamic of imitation will reduce variety among rival 
firms), contemporary resource-based theory claims firms are idiosyncratic in what 
they have and what they do (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996). Yet, empirical research 
efforts into coevolving drivers and effects have been limited thus far (Lewin and 
Volberda, 1999). We have the valuable contributions of Kieser (1989), who narrated 
how medieval guilds were replaced by mercantilist factories as markets and 
institutions coevolved. Furthermore, Levinthal and Myatt’s (1994) study of the mutual 
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fund business confirmed the existence of feedback effects between the firm’s ability 
to sustain market relations and its competitive position. 
 We respond to the lack of understanding of coevolutionary processes within 
the field of strategic management and to calls for more studies that synthesize firm- 
and industry-level perspectives in strategy and organization research (Levinthal, 1995; 
Lewin and Volberda, 1999). The purpose of this article is to gain insights into the 
coevolution of capabilities and competition within the competitive environment by 
developing an integrative framework, suggesting several propositions and by 
illustrating these in a longitudinal analysis of an industry. This is based on the 
assumption that search behavior drives coevolutionary processes. The framework will 
be illustrated in a longitudinal study of the music industry and will be divided into 
two parts. The first part concerns the period 1877-1990, discerns various competitive 
regimes at industry level, and analyses the capabilities that were founded and 
proliferated in each regime. The second part contains a multiple-case study covering 
the period 1990-1997 and focuses at firm level on the interaction between capabilities 
and competition during a particular competitive regime. The paper closes with a 
discussion of the findings, limitations, and key issues for future research. 
 
AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF COEVOLUTION  
 
The ‘behavioral theory of the firm,’ developed by Cyert and March (1963), pays 
attention to both organizational and competitive behavior, and therefore can be 
helpful for a coevolutionary analysis of capabilities and competition. This theory 
assumes that firms have some degree of control over their market environment, and 
that they adapt to their habitat through learning processes. Learning takes place after 
feedback loops bring new market knowledge to the organization, which confronts the 
firm with particular problems. Firms respond to such problems through what is called 
‘search’ behavior by which they pursue new or alternative ways of doing. According 
to Cyert and March (1963), firms display two basic types of search behavior: They 
can search in the neighborhood of current practice, or they can search for radically 
new alternatives. Cyert and March (1963) treated this distinction primarily in 
organizational terms, but stressed its applicability at the competitive level. Nelson and 
Winter (1982) also embraced this dichotomy by referring to it as local and distant 
search. This dual nature of search closely resembles March’s (1991) paradox of 
exploitation versus exploration.  
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Below, we develop a conceptual framework of coevolution of capabilities and 
competition where we assume that firms can be involved in different search processes 
(such as exploitative and explorative search behavior) at both the firm and the 
industry level. We will theorize on search behavior of rival firms starting with the 
level of the industry and then at firm levels of analysis. We will suggest a number of 
propositions, which will combine to form an integrative framework of coevolution. 
Figure 1 provides a road map, showing where we are going and the position of our 
propositions. Propositions 1.a, 1.b and 1.c refer primarily to the industry level of 
analysis, 2.a, 2.b and 2.c to issues at the level of the firm. Proposition 3 captures the 
reciprocal relationships in the coevolution of new organizational forms at firm level 
and new business models at industry level. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Coevolution from an Industry-Level Perspective 
Search behavior leads to capability development (Barnett and Hansen, 1996; Stuart 
and Podolny, 1996), and we begin by examining industry processes. Firms build 
capabilities in an industry environment where they compete with other rival firms, 
each of which employs its bundle of capabilities in the competitive process. Some 
firms try to create competitive advantages by introducing new capabilities to the 
industry; in response, others will replicate the capabilities. As more rivals find ways 
to build the capabilities required for competing under the new rules of the competitive 
game, the pioneer’s advantage disappears. Such interaction patterns of innovation and 
imitation form the endogenous drivers of an industry’s evolution (Schumpeter, 1934). 
It appears that, in a competitive context, many rivals are involved in search behavior 
to upgrade their capabilities. We will discuss below the upper part of Figure 1, by 
explaining why search behavior, the foundation and subsequently the proliferation of 
capabilities and the resulting competitive regime, over time are related to each other. 
In a behavioral view of the firm, rival firms are related to each other as each 
searches for new capabilities to compete in their industry (Cyert and March, 1963). In 
so-called “ecologies of competition”, “the competitive consequences of learning by 
one organization depend on learning by other organizations” (March, 1991: 81). In 
other words, actions taken by one company in search of capabilities have implications 
for the direction of search behavior at its rivals. In their study of local search for 
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technological positions, Stuart and Podolny (1996: 36) pointed out that “firms do not 
search in isolation; rather they search as members of a population of simultaneously 
searching organizations.” Companies become rivals not simply because they happen 
to operate in the same habitat, but because they influence each other’s search 
behavior. As Barnett and Hansen (1996: 141) pointed out: “competition triggers self-
reinforcing, reciprocal effects in an ecology of learning organizations”. In their search 
for capabilities, firms not only evolve in their role as competitors, but also activate 
new search behavior by the other players in a particular industry. The idea that it is 
the search behavior of players which underlies the competitive dynamics of an 
industry can be rephrased into the following 
 
Proposition 1.a: Innovation and imitation behavior at industry level drives the search 
for capabilities. 
 
The foundation and proliferation of capabilities. That competition evolves around the 
dynamics of innovation and imitation is common knowledge these days. Intuitively, 
one would think that innovation and imitation of capabilities at the industry level 
resemble practices of exploration and exploitation respectively: new capabilities are 
introduced by the innovator, while the imitators take care that the capabilities are 
further spread throughout the industry. Such reasoning would, however, ignore the 
notion that imitators “exercise entrepreneurship as much as the innovators 
themselves” (Jacobson, 1992: 788) because even from the imitator’s point of view, 
the search for new capabilities embodies a highly innovative activity (Winter, 
1984).The hard act of detecting and appreciating new questions is characteristic for 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs who search for new ways of competing that could make 
rivals’ positions obsolete. Early innovators rarely copy innovations exactly. They 
reject simplistic ideas such as success being “predetermined by mechanistic formulas” 
(Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1994: 26). Pioneering firms that successfully introduce 
new capabilities to the industry force their rivals to try to imitate those capabilities 
usually with improvements. During this process, the industry is marked by a period of 
turmoil in which both innovators and early imitators engage in explorative search for 
new capabilities. The resulting creative destruction is at the heart of the foundation of 
new capabilities at the industry level which, according to Schumpeter (1934), acts as a 
disequilibrating force.  
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 Ultimately, the growing prominence of imitation during an industry upheaval 
represents an equilibrating force that brings rival firms back to an equivalent level of 
capabilities, strategies and competition (Iwai, 1984). From the moment the industry’s 
rivals have managed to adopt the new competitive rules, they concentrate their 
subsequent efforts on getting “every ounce” out of them. In other words, competition 
does not turn into a state of perfect equilibrium once the industry leader’s competitive 
advantage has been eroded through imitation. Instead, competitive behavior of rival 
firms centers around further modification of the latest competitive recipe, “yet relying 
on the fundamental designs pioneered by the innovator” (Teece, 1987: 190). Instead 
of exploring radically new alternatives, rivals are typically involved in exploitative 
search behavior, which is directed at the stabilization of industry-wide conventional 
competitive practices over time (Cyert and March, 1963). 
 Put another way, after the initial phase of exploration, there is a phase of 
proliferation when search behavior is directed at the improvement of current and 
accepted practice. Although competition is still characterized by the dynamics of 
innovation and imitation, capabilities tend to disperse more quickly among the 
population of rivals. Close resemblance in thoughts, capabilities and activities places 
competitors “in a much better position to imitate or learn and build from each other’s 
work than firms with different strategies and capabilities” (Nelson, 1991: 70). The 
competitive process of imitation and innovation functions as a context in which rivals 
display two basic types of search behavior. On the one hand, explorative search 
involves the pursuit of alternative competitive formulas, and results in the foundation 
of novel capabilities at the industry level. On the other, exploitative search involves 
the hunt for expansion of current competitive recipes, and causes their further 
proliferation. Rivals interact competitively in both situations, be it that there may be 
differences in the ‘closeness’ of competition and the presence of competitive 
advantages. In sum, 
 
Proposition 1.b: Innovation and early imitation search behavior at industry level 
provide the foundation for new capabilities while later imitation 
positively influences their proliferation.  
 
Competitive regimes. The premise that capabilities are proliferated at the industry 
level once competitors have a shared understanding of the competitive rules has 
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implications for the industry’s evolution. When the search behavior of rival firms in 
an industry shifts towards exploitation of known capabilities, endless proliferation of 
capabilities via excessive exploitative search behavior may drive the industry into a 
downward spiral. In reality, most industries survive and continue to evolve as a result 
of two possible occurrences. First, there is almost always a basic level of diversity 
among the industry’s constituent firms (Nelson, 1991) resulting in competitive 
pressures for explorative search and introducing a new strategic innovation to the 
industry. Secondly, requisite variety may come from outside the industry. After all, 
the tendency of an industry’s incumbents to focus on exploitative search makes them 
rigid and susceptible to new entrants whose critical attitude towards established 
practice may return the industry to a state of creative destruction (Levinthal and 
March, 1993). In both situations, competitive dynamics “comprise powerful 
countervailing forces to the tendency for experience to eliminate exploration” (March, 
1991: 85). 
 Repeated over time, this dynamic of explorative and exploitative search 
behavior between incumbents and new entrants represents a principal driving force of 
industry evolution in which capabilities are founded and proliferated again and again 
(Hensmans et al., 2001). Often an industry evolves through a sequence of 
‘competitive regimes’ based upon particular competitive rules, business models, 
industry recipes, and capabilities. Dosi (1982) and Nelson and Winter (1982) coined 
the term regime and stressed that each period has its own distinctive paradigm of 
competition. Competitive regimes are characterized by distinct product markets, 
technologies, and stress particular business models such as those in which external 
networks and alliances are important for a firm’s competitive advantage (Koza and 
Lewin, 1999). The creative destruction that starts a new competitive regime makes the 
industry go through a series of discontinuities. Similar patterns of development have 
been reported in empirical studies on technological innovation (Abernathy and Clark, 
1985; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Thus,  
 
Proposition 1.c: Triggered by the foundation and proliferation of capabilities, the 
competitive dynamics of the interplay between incumbents and new 
entrants drive the sequence of competitive regimes over time. 
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Coevolution from a Firm-Level Perspective 
According to Cyert and March (1963), organizational learning is guided by so-called 
‘standard operation procedures’ (SOPs). These SOPs determine the degree and 
direction of the firm’s search behavior as a response to market feedback. Nelson and 
Winter (1982) translated the notion of SOPs into the concept of routines that are 
organizational carriers of knowledge and expertise. They argued that such routines 
influence firms’ search for new alternatives. Not only do routines shape the 
organizational processes underlying capabilities (Winter, 1995), but they are also key 
to the learning processes by which firms adapt to changes in their environment. This 
conforms to behavioral theory’s idea that organizations have some degree of control 
over their habitat, and implies a voluntary perspective of firm behavior as opposed to 
a deterministic one (Child, 1972). In this connection, Hedberg et al. (1976) 
discriminated between adaptive and manipulative (search) actions: whereas adaptation 
embodies a firm’s response to an environmental stimulus, an act of manipulation 
actually provokes such environmental reactions. More specific, “the adaptor defends, 
conforms or submits,” while the manipulator is “aggressive, proud, perhaps selfish” 
(1976: 46). Whereas the manipulating firm impresses itself into its competitive 
environment, the adapting organization maps its competitive environment onto itself. 
Thus,  
 
Proposition 2.a: Manipulation and adaptation behavior inside rival firms drives the 
search for capabilities. 
 
Creation and Refinement of Capabilities. Capabilities are difficult to relate to search 
behavior at the industry level as their origins unavoidable lie at the firm level. 
Although several definitions of capabilities focus on knowledge as the fundamental 
component of a firm’s capabilities (Grant, 1996) for our purpose more encompassing 
definitions like the capacity to deploy both tangible and intangible resources, 
including managerial resources (Penrose 1959), via distinct organizational and 
managerial processes (cf. Amit and Schoemaker, 1993) are more appropriate. Lado 
and Wilson (1994) suggest to distinguish four capability categories that allow for the 
explicit incorporation of search behavior as fundamental to the creation and 
redefinement of capabilities. These categories are managerial-, input-, transformation- 
and output-based capabilities. Managerial capabilities point at search behavior 
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regarding cognitive structures and mental models which underlie a strategic vision. 
The second category concerns search behavior regarding the acquisition and/or 
mobilization of specialized and unique assets. The third category involves innovation 
and organizational learning. The last category refers to physical outputs and to 
knowledge-based, intangible assets like reputation and relationship networks with e.g. 
suppliers and clients. 
Intraorganizational search behavior of firms is initiated by market feedback 
loops related to e.g. the value of intangible assets that internalize environmental 
knowledge into the organization (Cyert and March, 1963). According to Ghemawat 
and Ricat I Costa (1994: 59), firms can process information and know-how in two 
ways: “using it to search for improvements within a framework of fixed beliefs about 
how the environment behaves and responds to organizational actions vs. using it to 
reconsider the beliefs themselves.” Intuitively, one would think that, at the firm level, 
manipulation of and adaptation to the competitive environment resemble acts of 
exploration and exploitation respectively: while new practices are explored by 
manipulators, adapters engage in exploitative search of existing practices. However, 
this would discount resource-based theory’s idea that firms which adapt to changes in 
their habitat are involved in creative behavior as they dissociate themselves from path 
dependencies (Teece et al., 1997). Ghemawat (1991) discussed how increasing 
commitment to existing routines reduces a firm’s flexibility in changing environments 
and raises organizational inertia. Over time, such frictions permeate managerial and 
technical systems that, together with skills and values, make up the firm’s capabilities. 
When adaptation becomes a prerequisite for survival, firms often tend to stick to these 
routinized capabilities, turning them into core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992, 
Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). In spite of inertia, some firms do engage in 
explorative search, as their organization overcomes obstructions and their 
management experiments with new alternatives (Volberda, 1996). This is an activity 
of both manipulators and adapters.  
 Explorative search within a population of rivals is dedicated to the creation of 
new capabilities. At the industry level, rival companies will show an increasing 
degree of uniformity in (terms of the competitive outcomes of these) capabilities as 
more of them manage to adapt to the changed rules. But because individual firms 
have distinct histories that make them heterogeneous at a basic stratum, the way in 
which they create new capabilities (as well as their particulars) may differ 
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considerably (Nelson, 1991). This variety in capability construction increases once the 
various rival firms have managed to adapt, and start to refine the newly created 
capabilities. This two-phased process of capability development (creation and 
refinement) has been noted by Winter (1995: 51) in his distinction between a firm 
creative ability “to combine resources in novel ways and establish new activities” and 
its ability “to amplify the contributions of present resources and expand existing lines 
of activity.” Similarly, Tushman and Romanelli (1985) explained how organizations 
are often involved in fine-tuning in periods of convergent change, in which existing 
structures, activities and capabilities are even further exploited. These stages of fine-
tuning are punctuated by revolutionary organizational adaptation in which novel 
strategies, processes and capabilities are explored. Such radical shifts represent 
“revolutionary changes of the system” (1985: 185). Considering the above, we 
suggest the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2.b: Manipulative and early adaptive search behavior within firms 
creates the foundation for new capabilities, while later adaptive 
search behavior positively influences the refinement of capabilities. 
 
Organizational Change. The premise that capabilities are refined at the firm level 
once firms have managed to adapt to major changes in their competitive environment 
has implications for the way that organizations evolve over time. Most firms display a 
natural tendency to prefer exploitation to exploration (March, 1991), so the danger 
exists that they fall into so-called ‘competence traps’ (Levinthal and March, 1993). 
When the need to adapt to major changes in the competitive environment arises again, 
such organizational rigidity (Volberda, 1996) and lack of absorptive capacity can 
preclude the firm’s effective adaptation to the new circumstances by not being able to 
absorb the required new external knowledge (Van den Bosch et al., 1999). 
In contrast, some firms may be able to turn their efforts towards explorative 
search behavior again. This is subscribed by Hedberg et al. (1976), who explained 
that, once the need to adapt has been recognized, a firm initially intensifies its efforts 
to ‘do as before, but more.’ This search response represents “a course of action that 
can be rationalized as an attempt to last out a period of adversity that is perceived or 
hoped to be temporary” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 122). At a certain moment, 
investment postponement, cost cutting and asset reduction shape restructuring policies 
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to regain financial stability. Unlearning of established routines continues through 
changes in strategy, personnel and ideology. If the organization moves on, problem 
solving and exploration of new alternatives gradually build the routines and new 
capabilities required to pursue the firm’s novel strategic course (Baden-Fuller and 
Stopford, 1994) 
 Routines seem to play a key role in capability development. This is because 
capabilities are built on hierarchies of routines, some of which are hidden (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). Routines permeate the process of capability building, so that even 
during the creation of new capabilities inertia starts to penetrate firms’ organization 
structure and processes (Rumelt, 1995). In this connection, Baum and Korn (1999) 
distinguish between path dependent and path creation processes. In these processes, 
routines appear to be both a blessing and a curse: they are mandatory in processes of 
change to create new capabilities, but at the same time obstruct subsequent 
transformation processes as they increase inertia. Rival firms can therefore be 
expected to repeat the Hedberg et al. (1976) change trajectory over time during which 
the search for new capabilities at the firm level switches from creation to refinement 
and back. In other words,  
 
Proposition 2.c: The dynamics between managerial intentionality to create new 
capabilities and the impact of path dependencies on their refinement 
propels the emergence of a sequence of organizational changes over 
time. 
 
The above implies that successful firms evolve through multiple periods of 
organizational change or strategic renewal, in each of which capabilities are created 
and refined. The creation of capabilities is enabled by several attributes of the context-
, content- and process dimension of strategic change. The appointment of a new CEO 
is an important attribute of the context, while a change in the strategic intent and/or 
market positioning is a key attribute of the content of strategic change. Important 
attributes of the process dimension are the establishment of new ventures, alliances, 
and acquisitions including learning new skills and resolving dilemmas supporting the 
search for new capabilities during strategic change. 
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Combining Firm and Industry: Coevolution of Business Models and 
Organizational Forms 
From the above analysis, it appeared that the dynamic of explorative and exploitative 
search behavior drive the evolution of both the firm and the industry over time in a 
world where capabilities and competition coevolve.  At the same time, however, the 
foregoing made it clear that it can be difficult to split up search behavior distinctively 
at firm and industry levels of analysis. For instance, the concept of strategic 
innovation was discussed from an industry-level perspective, but essentially describes 
individual behavior at the firm. In a similar vein, the interaction between new entrants 
and incumbents relevant to the firm-level perspective also applies to the industry as 
well. The search concept appears to be crucial in combining firm and industry 
perspective of coevolution, as it not only highlights apparent similarities, but also 
exposes some noteworthy contrasts between the two. 
 One of these differences concerns the difficulties encountered by rival firms in 
different dispositions. Explorative search can be more laborious for the innovator than 
for its imitators, as the latter group of rivals searches for answers to a question already 
found by the pioneer. But at the same time it has been noted that explorative search is 
more difficult for adapters than for manipulators as the latter are free from the rigidity 
arising from established routines. The irony of course is that, in a competitive 
environment, innovating and imitating do not have an isomorphic correspondence 
with either the role of manipulator and adaptor respectively or with these of 
incumbents and new entrants. Instead of adopting a one-sides point of view towards 
search, an integrative perspective in which both firm and industry levels are taken into 
account could forestall such biases. Our integrative framework of coevolution of 
capabilities and competition (summarized in Figure 1) centers around the unifying 
concept of search behavior. 
 The firm searches for capabilities to adapt to, or even manipulate its 
competitive context. But as a collection of rival companies, firms are engaged in the 
search for capabilities at the more abstract level of competition where the dynamic 
process of innovation and imitation rules. Obviously, the creation and refinement of 
capabilities by firms impacts the development of capabilities at the industry level in 
terms of foundation and proliferation (and vice versa), simply because they coexist in 
an ecology of competition. Over time, these reciprocal relationships shape both firm 
and industry evolution as competitive forces make the search for capabilities alternate 
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between the rejuvenating properties of exploration and the self-destructive tendencies 
of exploitation. Interorganizational search at the industry level ultimately results in the 
emergence of new business models. These business models and the manifestation of 
competitive regimes can be defined by factors such as the nature of customer 
interaction, asset configuration and knowledge leverage (Venkatraman and 
Henderson, 1998). In a similar way, intraorganizational search results in the 
emergence of new organization forms or blue prints, often discussed in the literature 
(e.g. Daft and Lewin, 1993; Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Lewin et al., 1999; Volberda, 
1998). In short, new organization forms emerge alongside new business models in a 
coevolutionary manner, and so we suggest that:  
 
Proposition 3: Coevolution of firm capabilities and industry competition manifest 
itself in a reciprocal process between the emergence of new 
organizational forms at firm level and new business models at 
industry level. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
To illustrate the integrative framework on coevolution developed in this paper, we 
investigate processes of search and coevolution at two different levels of analysis in 
the music industry. Covering the period between 1877 and 1990, we detect shifts in 
competition, i.e. competitive regimes, over time. In contrast, processes of search and 
coevolution at the firm level are examined via a multiple-case study of individual 
record companies over the more limited time frame of the period 1990-1997. 
 The rationale for studying coevolution between capabilities and competition in 
the music industry is threefold. Ranked second only behind book publishing, music is 
the oldest software industry with a history that spans more than 100 years, which 
makes it particularly suitable for the detection of long-term patterns. Furthermore, 
knowledge is crucial in the performance and survival of record companies, that 
capabilities are in essence integrated knowledge components (Grant, 1996, De Boer et 
al., 1999) makes this industry adequate for investigation. Finally, the music industry 
is one of the so-called cultural industries, which have, until recently, only been of 
marginal interest to management and organization scholars as objects of empirical 
research. Although the film industry has gained some ground as a research site (e.g., 
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DeFillippi and Arthur, 1998; Miller and Shamsie, 1996), relatively little is known to 
strategy scholars on organizational and competitive dynamics. The present study aims 
to fill this gap by means of both a historical study and a multiple-case study of the 
music industry, of which methodological issues as data collection, analysis and 
validity are discussed below.  
 The music industry “is a complex animal” (Malm and Wallis, 1992:5) 
encompassing a variety of actors. In describing the music industry environment, 
however, we primarily focus on the issues raised in the proposition on competitors 
and the competitive environment (micro and meso level of analysis). We exclude 
discussion of field formation (Anand and Peterson, 2000), important institutional 
dimensions and extra – institutional influences like social movements (Lewin et al; 
1999) and management logic (Dijksterhuis et al; 1999). We will come back to this 
limitation in the discussion section.  
 
Historical Study 1877-1990.  The historical study of the music industry builds on data 
that has been disclosed in a variety of articles and books on the music industry outside 
the boundaries of strategic management research. Malm and Wallis (1992) have 
pointed out that before the 1970s there were remarkably few relevant studies of the 
music industry. Because of this, the many secondary sources from which our 
qualitative data was retrieved stem from the 1970s and can be roughly divided in three 
streams. First, research publications on the economics of the music industry offered 
insights into topics of industry organization, musical innovation and structural 
changes (Peterson and Bergen, 1975; Lopes, 1992; Christianen, 1995). The second 
domain involved writing about individual firms, and provided intelligence on the 
activities and organization of record companies as well as the technologies they 
applied (Peterson and Berger, 1971; Denisoff, 1986; Negus, 1992). Finally, studies in 
communication supplied information on the relationship between the record business 
and the media industries (Gronow, 1983; Laing, 1992; Malm and Wallis, 1992). 
Quantitative data was collected from three respected industry associations: the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), the National Music Publishers’ 
Association (NMPA) and the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
(IFPI). The observed diversity in secondary sources enabled a check for data 
consistency both within and across these streams of cultural studies. In addition to 
such ‘within-method’ triangulation (Denzin, 1978), the historical study’s reliability 
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was enhanced by means of ‘between-method’ triangulation (Jick, 1979). This was 
achieved via a confrontation of the longitudinal body of qualitative data with the more 
robust and quantitative data that had been collected at the various industry 
associations, and covered parts or most of the period under consideration. 
 In line with previous coevolution studies (Lewin and Volberda, 1999; 
Pettigrew, 1997), analysis of the organized data set was performed along two related 
activities: (1) a search for patterns in processes out of a sequence of events, and (2) a 
search for the underlying mechanisms that shaped these patterns. To illustrate the 
advanced propositions on coevolution at the industry level, the first of these activities 
involved the detection of various competitive regimes in terms of distinct product 
markets (Porter, 1980), organizational value chains (Porter, 1985) and technologies 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In a similar vein, the second activity concerned the 
identification of record companies’ capabilities around which competition evolved 
during a particular competitive regime. As mentioned above, these were classified 
according to one of four capability categories, as proposed by Lado and Wilson 
(1994): managerial, input-based, transformation-based and output-based capabilities. 
This particular typology allows for the explicit incorporation of search behavior.  
 
Multiple-Case Study 1990-1997. Whereas the historical study deals with coevolution 
over various competitive regimes, the multiple-case study is directed at the 
reciprocities between capabilities and competition during a particular competitive 
regime. While the focal issue of inquiry at the various case companies was their 
search for new capabilities, differences in the way these companies searched were of 
special interest.  
Over the years, the significance of the British music industry has increased, 
both within the UK and to music markets in the rest of the world. With a sales value 
of over £1 billion, the UK is the world’s third largest market, and industry trade 
association British Phonographic Industry (BPI) even claims that the UK music 
industry is far more important as an international repertoire provider. 
 It was acknowledged that different types of record companies operated in the 
music industry each experiencing different types of organizational change processes: 
acquired independents, major operating companies, and independents. Our six case 
companies were chosen (see Table 1) based on the above theoretical classification 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In each company, a top manager was contacted and asked to 
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participate in the research project through two semi-structured, usually tape-recorded, 
interviews with duration of 60 to 90 minutes. These interviews asked about context 
and content of capabilities and competition over the period of study. The time-
consuming exercise of mining multiple informants throughout the company was 
traded off for the top manager’s position as the most knowledgeable about the (impact 
of) changes within the firm (Glick et al., 1990). To offset a resulting bias in data 
collection, further public information on the case companies was accumulated, 
primarily through the inspection of all issues of two respected industry trade journals, 
Music Week and Music Business International, for the period 1990-1997. In addition, 
all six editions of The UK Record Industry Annual Survey (from 1993 to 1998) were 
consulted to retrieve financial and accounting data on individual record companies. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 For each case company, a ‘data collection file’ was created in which all 
longitudinal data was chronologically ordered. The company files came to be the 
groundwork for our in-depth case descriptions of organizational change at each of the 
companies, and our tables that outlined the major events during the period of 
transformation. Both the case descriptions and the event tables were reviewed, 
corrected and commented upon by the interviewees, and provided a basic input for 
further analysis. In each case, the three core dimensions of organizational changes as 
described above were used to illustrate the advanced propositions of coevolution at 
the firm level. First of all, the context of change was analyzed along possible drivers 
of transformation e.g. new executives or a performance decline. In addition, the 
content of changes at each case company was explored in terms of its vision, scope, 
positioning and capabilities – in other words, its competitive strategy. Finally, the 
change process was measured in terms of attributes (such as learning new skills, 
internal ventures and new alliances) as deduced from prominent management 
literature on strategic change (e.g. Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Barker and 
Duhaime, 1997). These inquiries facilitated cross-case analysis on the role of change 
in record companies’ search for capabilities. 
 The multiple-case study’s internal validity concerns verification of the 
causality between key constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989), and appears to be significant: all 
the individual case studies displayed how their search for capabilities embodied a 
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process of organizational change which, in the end, determined their market 
performance. The multiple-case study’s external validity concerns the generalizability 
of its findings (Yin, 1984) and seems to be high for the music industry: six 
companies, which together held an average share of 30% of the UK music market 
over the period 1990-1997, were studied in up to three different types of companies. 
The multiple-case study’s construct validity deals with the question whether the 
gathered evidence truly supports its findings (Eisenhardt, 1989) and appears to be at 
an acceptable level: both data sources (private and public) and data collection 
techniques (executive interviews and article tracking) were subjugated to 
triangulation, whereas the case descriptions and event tables were reviewed by the 
interviewees (i.e., the key informants) themselves. 
 
HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 
 
Starting near the end of the nineteenth century, the following section presents a 
longitudinal study into more than hundred years of co-evolution of capabilities and 
competition in the music industry. On the basis of the proposed integrative 
framework, in the following pages we describe and analyze the history of the music 
industry from 1877. Table 2 classifies the competitive regimes that existed in the 
music industry from 1877-1990, which will be described below. Table 3 summarizes 
our analysis which links capabilities foundations to competitive regimes. Table 2 and 
3 are related to the industry level, the upper part of the integrative framework, see 
Figure 1. Table 4 captures our findings about the connection between changing 
business models at industry level and new organizational forms at firm level as is 
indicated by proposition 3. 
 
[Insert Tables 2-3-4 about here] 
 
Competition for Hardware Technology: 1877 to 1914, Edison, Berliner, 
Colombia 
Today’s music industry with its global presence and worldwide sales of more than 40 
billion US$ has its foundations in the vision and determination of two individuals. 
The first was Thomas Edison who invented the phonograph in 1877. Edison was 
convinced that the most important applications of his new machine lay in the 
reproduction of speech for purposes of dictation and education, as was reflected in the 
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name of his enterprise: the Edison Speaking Company (Schicke, 1974). There was a 
short supply of recordings and a lack of an acceptable degree of fidelity, which 
limited consumers’ adoption. Although companies such as the North American 
Phonograph Company and the Dictaphone Corporation acquired licenses and 
marketed the dictating machines, it was the license from Colombia Phonograph 
Corporation that saw the real commercial value of the phonograph to be in the 
entertainment sector (Frith, 1992). It noticed how its machine’s sound-provoking 
characteristics attracted public attention at penny arcades, fairs and amusement 
centers. 
 In 1887, Berliner patented a rivaling phonograph that reproduced sound 
through a horizontal movement of the stylus over a flat disc that rotated on a turntable 
rather than Edison’s drums. Berliner recognized that his gramophone’s commercial 
value was to bring entertainment - especially music - right into people’s homes (Frith, 
1992). Seeing that a supply of high-quality sound recordings was a prerequisite to 
make his product attractive to the consumer market, he developed a system for the 
efficient manufacturing of high-fidelity recordings by using a zinc plate as master 
record. By separating the recording process from the reproduction stage, Berliner was 
able to make more duplicates at less cost with easier distribution and higher quality 
(Jones, 1992). 
 The United States Gramophone Company introduced Berliner’s gramophone 
on the market for home entertainment in 1895. This new competition forced Edison to 
respond fast. He improved his product by developing a spring-motor driven 
phonograph and joined with Colombia to sell the phonograph in the home 
entertainment market (Jones, 1992). Over the next five years, rivalry between disc and 
cylinder manufacturers was governed by fights over patent rights and a stream of 
minor technological innovations (Negus, 1992). For instance, Edison developed a 
molding process to ‘mass produce’ his pre-recorded wax cylinders, whilst Berliner 
joined up with Eldridge Johnson, who had talents in organization and finance, to form 
the Victor Talking Machine Company in 1901. 
 Johnson, who had managed to create a structured organization out of 
Berliner’s chaotic laboratory, licensed Victor’s technology to new and existing firms 
such as Colombia and British Gramophone. By 1907, it was clear Victor had won the 
‘standardization battle’ between disc and cylinder (Schicke, 1974). Victor cemented 
its victory taking up a 50% stake in British Gramophone and split up the world into 
 19
various territories (Gronow, 1983). Victor took care of the United States and 
established agencies in Central and South American countries, as well as in China, 
Japan and the Philippines. British Gramophone set up plants in Russia, India and the 
main countries of Europe, from which smaller countries and colonies Africa, 
Southeast Asia and the Middle East were managed through agencies. 
 
Competition for Software: 1914 to 1930s, New Entry by Content Providers 
When Victor’s basic patents expired in 1914, more firms entered to supply machines 
and several major companies were involved in pressing discs for not just their own 
label, but also third parties (Jones, 1992). In addition, entrepreneurs established small 
recording companies to market their own products, recorded and pressed by larger 
companies, on a private label (Gronow, 1983). These business practices emphasized 
the distinction between selling gramophones and making & trading recordings. It 
became clear that selling recordings in large quantities was very profitable. Most of 
the record corporations recognized this switch from hardware to software, and aimed 
to capture the biggest piece of the newer market (Gronow, 1983). The common 
approach was to provide a broad range recognizing themes such as dancing, jazz and 
ragtime. Variety did not always give rise to high unit volumes. Sales of a few 
thousand records per title were typical and economies of scale could not be realized, 
even though the overall market was large. 
 During these years, recording companies were managed and (partially) owned 
by engineers, supported mainly by technicians (Frith, 1992). The emphasis in the 
firm’s policies was therefore largely technological in character: resources were 
primarily directed at a gradual improvement of the manufacturing and recording 
processes. At the same time, technically skilled managers decided on what was to be 
released on record, but they were only to a minor degree interested in the music itself. 
 The continuing work on product and process innovation at the technologically 
oriented recording companies after the First World War further reduced the costs of 
machines (Jones, 1992). By 1929, about 50% of all US households owned a machine, 
and firms simulated sales of machines by introducing market segmentation policies. 
Gramophone models that featured electric motors were introduced in relatively small 
numbers at high prices; newly developed portable wind-up gramophones were 
manufactured and sold at low prices in huge quantities (Gronow, 1983). This increase 
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in machine sales stimulated the growth of record sales. In 1929, more than 150 
million records were sold in the US, an increase of 50% over the 1921 figure. 
 During the 1920s, this stress on technology-related issues impacted the content 
of record companies’ release policies. The leading firms came to compete for a 
limited number of well-known and very popular theatre and opera performers, often 
releasing exactly the same songs or new versions of those recordings. These imitative 
policies were even further amplified through low-cost recordings of popular songs or 
concerts by anonymous studio performers and symphony orchestras (Frith, 1992). 
Instead of pursuing a more entrepreneurial policy of promoting and releasing new and 
promising artists, major record companies kept doing the same over and over again. 
 
Competition for Markets  
1930s – Radio’s competition – Decca’s Entry – The New Star System. Due to the 
Great Depression and the success of radio broadcasting as a substitute form of 
entertainment, record sales fell from 150 million units in 1929 to 25 million in 1935, 
forcing many small recording firms and a few big ones out of the business (Gronow, 
1983). The success of radio pointed to the need for new strategy and this came from 
an entrant not an incumbent. Decca Records, incorporated in the United States in 
1934 by Jack Kapp and Ted Lewis, was the first record company that created 
economies of scale in an industry characterized by high initial costs of recording and 
relatively low reproduction costs (Sanjek, 1991). Kapp realized that he needed to sell 
massive amounts of only a few releases in order to make his business extremely 
profitable. Instead of investing his partner’s $250, 000 in gramophone manufacturing, 
Kapp dedicated his resources solely to records. On top of that, he developed the ‘star 
system’, a new business concept that was based on his ability to discover fresh market 
opportunities and to design new marketing techniques. 
 Kapp created a compact artist roster of stars such as the Dorsey Brothers and 
Bing Crosby, whom he had lured away from Brunswick Records, his previous 
employer. In addition, he developed intensive aggressive marketing and promotion 
campaigns (Frith, 1992). Kapp also exploited the emerging market for coin-operated 
machines, and obtained a substantial market share in the profitable jukebox market 
(Sanjek, 1991). 
By 1939, the market had recovered somewhat, as consumers regained 
confidence (Gronow, 1983). RCA-Victor, Colombia and Decca were the three largest 
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firms. In 1939, Decca sold more than 13 million records, while its share of the 
jukebox market rose to 90%. However, it was not long before RCA-Victor and CBS-
Colombia targeted the jukebox market segment in response to Decca’s success (CBS 
bought Colombia from American in 1938). The entrance of these established major 
record companies triggered a rapid growth of the jukebox business segment, which by 
then accounted for approximately 60% of all record sales. While responding to 
Decca’s successful strategy, the major record companies changed their organizations 
in fundamental ways. A business-orientated CEO replaced the technically skilled 
inventor, who had traditionally headed recording firms in the pre-recession years, 
with a strong personality. The domination of technical staff was reduced as 
technological research activities were disconnected from record business operations 
and transferred to parent companies (Negus, 1992). Furthermore, brand-new 
departments were installed with large marketing and promoting staffs. In the end, the 
established record companies managed to imitate Decca’s highly profitable market 
strategy. The immediate result was that both the amount and variety of new releases 
declined considerably, but that the quantity produced of each release was enormous 
(Sanjek, 1991). Record sales in 1938 had an estimated value of $26 million compared 
to $6 million in 1933, the bottom year of the depression. 
 
1930s and early 1940s– New Strategies – Radio moves from competitor to 
collaborator. Profits in 1938 were still just a third of what they had been in 1929, and 
radio was still the record industry’s main competitor. This forced the major firms to 
reshape their strategy again in the early 1940s (Frith, 1992). They shifted their focus 
from established but expensive celebrities, to developing and building new (but 
relatively cheap) recording stars. This created new musical market segments. Whereas 
the public used to buy recordings by popular artists known from the theatre or concert 
hall, they now bought music from previously unknown company-created stars. As a 
consequence, live performances became replications of recordings instead of the other 
way around. 
 This new relationship between records, artists and markets coincided with new 
promotion techniques. Up to the moment, firms had used billboards and newspapers 
but the market coverage of these tools was limited. Radio with its extensive 
broadcasting networks and nation-wide coverage became the new outlet to promote 
the new unknown artists (Sanjek, 1991). In the past a competitor, radio now co-
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evolved to became collaborator. Radio stations presented record companies the 
opportunity to promote their newly developed stars who, on their turn provided radio 
with a cheap form of programming. Secure links were established between the rival 
industries. In 1929, the RCA corporation with its NBC radio had purchased Victor 
network industry, and in this way new stars were exploited on three fronts: film, radio 
and records. This was the time of Bing Crosby, Benny Goodman and Glenn Miller, 
and the start of a new era in which music such as jazz and big band came to dominate 
companies’ classical repertoire. Record sales rose: 1940 revenues doubled those of 
1938. And in 1940, 100 million records were sold. The Second World War not only 
triggered American sales but also increased companies’ international revenues. 
Worldwide popularity of US-based music flourished as American soldiers, 
functioning as exporters, liberated many overseas countries (Gronow, 1983). 
 
Arrival of Alternative Music: Late 1940s & 1950s 
During the first ten years after the war, major record firms were focused on the 
production of classical music on the one hand, and jazz and big band as alternative 
forms of popular music on the other. In 1948, a new entrant called Atlantic Records 
stepped into the R&B (rhythm and blues) segment of the market (Gillett, 1988). It was 
followed by other small independent, but highly entrepreneurial labels such as 
Imperial, Dot, Sun and Chess. Atlantic and other small independent record labels co-
operated with local radio stations, as both realized that the consumer really wanted 
more variety in music styles (Peterson and Berger, 1975). This made it possible for 
small independents to get their records played on air by a large number of radio 
stations. 
 But the new radio competitive environment in the United States was not the 
only factor in the emerging success of independent labels that searched for new 
musical styles. The cost advantages of tape recording and the mobility of its 
equipment enabled small record companies to create their own studio and recordings 
at acceptable cost (Jones, 1992). The new editing possibilities of tape recording, 
enhanced by the development of the two-track system and the invention of ‘stereo’ in 
1958, also contributed to the development of new musical styles as artists and 
producers experimented with tape’s new opportunities. In addition, invention of the 
microgroove record had made it possible to distribute more records at far less costs. 
As a consequence, a host of distribution companies were born, functioning as the 
 23
minor record companies’ lifeline to the retail market (Peterson, 1990). Independents 
mainly released individual songs on singles, and these 45-rpm records took far less 
storage space and handling time than the larger 331/3 LPs. Moreover, the number of 
different places where one could buy a record expanded as a result of new distribution 
channels. Next to the traditional retailers, records were now sold at departments of 
warehouses or other specialty stores, and even by mail via record clubs (Mittlestaedt 
and Stassen, 1994). 
 After 1955, a host of small but entrepreneurial record labels was responsible 
for a significant increase in both the variety and number of new releases. In these 
years, artists like Elvis Presley, Jerry Lee Lewis, Chuck Berry and Little Richard 
achieved tremendous success. The independent sector flourished. Whereas the big 
four owned approximately 75% of the $277 million US record market in 1955, by 
1959 their share tumbled to 34% of a growing market that reached a value of $603 
million. 
 The rigid organizational structures of the major corporations appeared to be 
one of the factors that inhibited a timely response to new market conditions (Peterson, 
1990). The person responsible for A&R (artist and repertoire) at the independent 
record firm was the entrepreneur (Gillett, 1988) who usually had a feeling for what 
kind of music or artist could be successful in the future. Furthermore, he (or she) was 
an expert on all aspects of the business, from producer to promoter, and was often in 
charge of the firm.  
 The significance of the A&R role and the key position of radio disc jockeys as 
gatekeepers were not immediately recognized by the lagging major companies. 
Initially, these firms aimed to recapture lost market share by directing their attention 
towards the LP instead of the single, and by offering discounts to most of the 
country’s distributors. By 1964 the big four realized that the music styles of R&B and 
rock ‘n’ roll were not just passing fads. The market had continued to grow in these 
turmoil years, and this growth was a direct consequence of the independent record 
firms’ discovery that these new music styles strongly appealed to the youth part of the 
market (Frith, 1992). The majors had never really addressed this younger generation 
(Denisoff, 1986). 
 The major companies that had been so successful in the first decade after the 
war were not only being hurt by a host of successful independents, but were also 
under attack from foreign companies that entered their home market. In 1955, EMI 
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had acquired Capitol, one of the four majors, while Philips’ record division 
Phonogram had purchased full-grown independent Mercury to enter the American 
market only six years later. Unlike their US counterparts, these European firms were 
deeply involved in the development of local music and artists. 
 Eventually, the US firms reorganized their companies and altered their 
traditional market strategies. Emphasis was now placed on the discovering and 
developing new talent in the popular music field, and special A&R departments were 
created (Peterson and Berger, 1975). They also invested heavily to intensify their 
relationships with radio and the newly emerging TV. Recording stars not only had 
their own typical style of music, but also propagated a unique and eccentric image; it 
was in these turbulent years that sound and image became inseparable (Frith, 1992). 
 By 1964, Colombia and Capitol showed that they had been able to adjust to 
the changing market conditions when their newly incorporated A&R departments 
achieved success with the discovery of hot acts like the Beach Boys and Bob Dylan 
(Peterson and Berger, 1975). RCA failed to establish itself in the market for popular 
music. It tumbled from the first to the very last position in America’s top ten record 
companies within ten years. It survived through its superior position in classical music 
and its highly profitable but coincidental contract with Elvis Presley (Gillett, 1988). 
Even Decca, once prominent entrepreneurial records company and pioneer of the star 
system, was not able to retain its competitive position as its rivals released hit after 
hit. 
 
Competition for Labels – 1960s & 1970s – Warner’s entry and the Federal 
System 
The most remarkable new entrant during the 1960s was Warner, a diversified firm 
that achieved success by introducing a new way to build and structure a record 
company organization. The big movie corporation Warner Brothers had noticed the 
ease with which independent labels had ruined the dominance of the major record 
companies (Sanjek, 1991). This prompted Warner to create Warner Records and buy 
Frank Sinatra’s Reprise Records in 1963. When Steve Ross, president of Kinney 
Corporation, gained financial control of Warner Seven Arts (the holding company), 
he reconfigured Warner’s music assets, and acquired three of America’s most 
successful independent record labels; Atlantic, Elektra and Asylum (Sanjek, 1991). 
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 Steve Ross’ innovation was the ‘label federation’ concept, in which individual 
labels continued to operate in a relatively autonomous manner. Under the Warner 
umbrella, separate divisions were created according to music genre: middle-of-the-
road (Warner and Reprise), rock (Elektra and Asylum), and R&B and soul (Atlantic). 
This formula enabled the labels to maintain their innovative character in accordance 
with the specific characteristics of their particular target markets (Denisoff, 1986). At 
the same time, the parent company reaped synergistic benefits as it created a 
company-wide manufacturing and distribution set-up called WEA to exploit 
economies of scale (Lopes, 1992). As the first record company with a multi-divisional 
organizational structure, Warner became the leader of the US record industry with a 
15% market share in 1969 only ten years after its diversification into recorded music. 
 Warner became a role model and others replicated its radically new 
organizational approach. In 1969, Colombia purchased Bell Records, renamed it 
Arista and placed the label in a separate and semi-autonomous division. The Music 
Corporation of America (MCA), originally a talent agency, stepped into the record 
business by creating its own label, and in 1967 acquired Decca. To expand its interest 
in the American record industry, PolyGram (created in 1972 by merging Phonogram 
and Polydor) purchased RSO Records in 1975 and invested in Casablanca Records. 
All of these companies adopted divisionalized structure. As consequence, the number 
of successful independent labels declined, while the US returned to an oligopolistic 
setting with the old names dominating the industry (Lopes, 1992).  
For many firms, maximization of album sales became the prime objective, and 
it was in this era that new marketing and promotion tools such as cover graphics, 
radio and TV advertising, live concerts, press interviews and photo sessions were 
developed and refined (Denisoff, 1986). Whereas the success of an established artist 
could be predicted without too much difficulty, forecasting whether a newcomer’s 
album will be a hit was more difficult. This uncertainty had much to do with the 
uncertainty about of consumers’ taste. 
 During the 1970s, the majors started to cope with this market uncertainty by 
spreading their risks (Denisoff, 1986). As the average chance of success for a newly 
developed act was even less than 10 percent, major corporations began to release an 
enormous amount of new products. Coincidentally, the industry experienced a sales 
growth from $2.0 million in 1973 to $4.1 billion in 1978 and there was a rise in 
prominence of international players such as EMI and PolyGram. With cassette as 
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medium, CBS being present on an international level was finally recognized by the 
American giants. CBS and Warner increased the activities in Europe in these years 
(Laing, 1992). Next to selling US-based records, their European units became more 
and more involved with the development of local acts and the creation of national 
artist rosters. Likewise, they built company-owned distribution channels in most of 
the countries on the European continent. 
 
The 1980s - Competition for Catalogues – Profits from Intellectual Property 
Rights 
In 1978, the global record industry flourished like it had never done before. But this 
sunny situation was severely clouded when the industry went into a painful recession 
during the final months of 1979. Market sales tumbled between 1979 and 1983 
(Denisoff, 1986). In response, the major companies restructured their organizations: 
marketing and promotion budgets were minimized, new talent inflow came to a halt, 
and artist development was restricted. All remaining resources were directed at the 
cultivation of superstars. Thousands of employees, especially within A&R and 
marketing functions, were fired. But consumer interest into music was revived as a 
result of the introduction of MTV and the development of the compact disc by Philips 
(Burnett, 1996). CD companies were still modest in the early eighties compared to LP 
and cassette sales. Prices for CD players fell rapidly, enabling the average customer to 
buy this new audio equipment, but the record industry maintained it original price 
levels for the compact disc. The new format’s compactness and solidity made easier 
shipping, cutting distribution costs which more than compensated for higher recording 
costs. Profits on compact discs were considerably higher than profit margins on LPs 
and cassettes had ever been. 
 Pleased with the enhanced quality of the CD system, consumers replaced their 
existing LP collections with a new assortment of compact discs. This demand for old 
music on new material was quickly recognized by the major record companies, which 
re-released their existing catalogue on CD (Burnett, 1996). The enthusiasm with 
which consumers purchased CDs containing ‘old’ music material made the major 
record companies aware of the importance of owning a large inventory of music from 
the past. The profit in the business shifted from the physical manufacturing and 
distribution of music products to the exploitation of copyrights attached to old 
recordings (Qualen, 1985). Revenues could not only be generated through sales of 
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music released on a particular format, but could also be collected by exploiting the 
rights connected to that piece of music. 
 Inspired by rising sales and bright forecasts, the major record firms looked for 
new avenues to exploit their rights on a larger scale, and intensified their international 
approach to the music market by increasing foreign investment (Wallis and Malm, 
1984). An international structure of operating companies made local artist 
development possible, while multinational distribution networks supported the multi-
country release of records. Moreover, the major companies could cultivate their 
existing catalogues in new countries to new consumers. The expanding possibilities 
surrounding the exploitation of their copyrights made record companies jump into the 
business of music publishing during the second half of the eighties (Wallis and Malm, 
1984). As the majors recognized the significance of a large back catalogue, they 
turned their attention to independent-publishing companies and they began to 
purchase small and local publishing houses (Burnett, 1996). According to the NMPA, 
music-publishing revenues on a worldwide level grew 10% a year from 1982 onwards 
to more than $3.5 million by 1990, more than 20% of which was accounted for by the 
US. 
 The sudden emphasis on this secondary source of income also changed record 
companies’ attitude towards the value of television broadcasting and global 
advertising (Malm and Wallis, 1992). Company revenues were increasingly through 
licensing fees from media companies that created films, books, magazines, videos, 
and other consumer products. However, the opportunities to cultivate rights across a 
wide range of media did not escape the attention of corporations operating in other 
entertainment industries. These firms recognized the central role of music within 
different forms of entertainment, and were attracted by the increase in music sales and 
music’s potential to link these segments in a synergistic way (Laing, 1992). 
Ownership structures within the music industry also changed radically as major 
record companies came under the control of multinational corporations in the multi-
media & publishing and consumer electronics industries. Warner Music had become 
part of Time-Warner, while Japanese conglomerates Sony and Matsushita had 
incorporated CBS and MCA. Thorn, Philips and Germany’s Bertelsmann owned EMI, 
PolyGram, and RCA respectively. At the start of the 1990s, these six companies 
dominated almost 80% of the global record industry. 
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MULTIPLE-CASE STUDY OF 1990S 
 
The period described above has focused on the co-evolution between streams of new 
entrants and incumbent firms, and on strands of technology and on radio versus record 
companies between 1877 & 1990. The next section presents a finer grained study that 
covers an eight-year period (1990-1997) of co-evolution of capabilities and 
competition in the British music industry. It describes and analyses co-evolution from 
a firm level perspective as described in the lower part of the integrative framework in 
Figure 1. Below we describe and analyze how six record companies created and 
refined capabilities during a particular competitive regime in which the rules of the 
game were again redefined. Furthermore, we highlight the context, content and 
process of organizational change of these companies. In discussing the content of 
organizational change, we pay attention to the creation and refinement of capabilities. 
 
EMI & POLYGRAM introduce New Competitive Rules after Acquiring Former 
Independents 
During the start of the nineties, UK record sales declined bringing a sudden halt to the 
UK industry’s successful path of development. At the same time, the joint market 
share of British independent labels began to erode when the most celebrated of these 
companies were attached by major record corporations. In their search for record 
catalogues and publishing rights, EMI and PolyGram purchased in the period 1989 - 
1992, Chrysalis Records, Virgin Music, Island Records and A&M Records, the four 
biggest independent record companies, raising their combined market share from 29% 
to 45%. Because independent record companies were traditionally regarded as the 
engine of musical innovation, this merging of majors and “indies” was not favorably 
received. In the press, many said that it would obstruct the symbiotic process between 
other groups and therefore block a renewal of artists and music, which the industry so 
badly needed now that it was perceived to be in a state of depression. However, an 
unexpected and constructive side effect would emerge out of these take-overs. 
 The 1989 acquisition of Island Records by PolyGram triggered organizational 
change (see Table 5). We will pay attention to the context, content and process of this 
change process. Although Island Records had experienced an average 3.6% market 
share between 1984 and 1988, its market performance had suddenly declined. In the 
year of its take-over, Island Records had a 0.8percentage market share, due to a 
 29
departure of its superstars. PolyGram appointed a new managing director (MD) who 
noticed a new opportunity for his company around the exploitation of existing 
catalogues and the development acts into mainstream pop music. According to 
interviews with the company, this MD developed a new vision in which the label’s 
successful music history could be merged with the commercial demands of the future. 
His primary aim was to lift Island to a situation in which it introduced new alternative 
artists as well as new musical genres to the market, but to a much larger audience than 
was previously thought possible. Traditionally the record industry held that 
innovation in music and the commercial market were mutually exclusive opposites, 
and as the 1990s progressed they became integrated. The cases described in this 
section show this process of integration within and between firms. But the MD based 
his change program on a different perception of the business, and positioned Island as 
a commercially alternative record label among it rivals. To be successful, Island 
needed to create new capabilities to realize it novel strategy. Its dormant A&R 
capabilities had to be awoken, while capabilities in marketing had to be bred 
considering the near absence of marketing skills within the company. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 According to interviews with company executives, as a prelude to the 
mandatory restructuring of Island’s organizational processes, its video division was 
streamlined, while the art department was terminated. In addition, 40% of the 
company’s staff was discharged to make room for new people from outside the firm 
with experience and skills in both A&R and marketing. The new MD structured 
Island’s organizational processes to conform to the designs he had observed at 
individual labels of major record companies. This enabled him to place managers with 
a ‘corporate’ history at top positions and put staff with working experience at “indies” 
in front-line positions. The heightened awareness of commercial aspects also required 
the launch of a new legal and business affairs department that would keep track of the 
label’s property rights and contractual relationships. The original founder’s influence 
on the label’s direction was eroded. Finally, new skills were learned as new acts and 
music styles were marketed on a broad consumer market. In the end, Island Records 
managed to resolve the dilemma between innovation in, and commercialization of, 
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music. The actions transformed Island’s financial performance, evidenced by growth 
of turnover and profits during the first half of the nineties. 
 Virgin Records also experienced a successful turnaround. As a fast follower to 
Island’s strategic innovation (be it that Virgin pursued a more pronounced 
international strategy), Virgin managed to triple its turnover and to double its profits 
during the first five years after the label had been acquired by Thorn-EMI in 1992. 
According to interviews in Virgin, the internal organization was structured as a 
company-owned network of small satellite labels, which were categorized into three 
broader music divisions (pop, alternative, and dance). This new organizational set-up 
facilitated the development of specific A&R and marketing capabilities at the front-
line level where creativity was key, while the company’s more general A&R and 
marketing course was planned at top level. All this cumulated in Virgin’s ability to 
resolve the dilemma between diversity in artist development and targeted marketing at 
the global level. 
 
Majors BMG and Warner respond 
In contrast to EMI and PolyGram, which relied on acquisition, BMG UK (part of 
Bertelsmann) built its strategy on a comprehensive approach to collaboration. 
Because the firm had its roots in RCA, the American records company that once had 
been one of the ‘big four’ companies until mid-1950s, BMG’s repertoire had been 
primarily US-based. But as British music was important to the company’s 
International group, the UK company had to create a sound base of local repertoire. 
Table 6 displays the findings of company interviews that revealed the context, content 
and process of organizational change, and summarizes BMG’s search for capabilities 
in a changing competitive environment. In contrast to the cases of Island and Virgin, 
there was no change of ownership to trigger the change process. Although RCA had 
been acquired by multi-media conglomerate Bertelsmann AG, this had already 
happened in 1986. While RCA’s US-based musical focus was indirectly responsible 
for the changes that were about to take place, a time lag of some six years makes it 
difficult to assume the presence of a direct causality. Although no executive 
replacements occurred at the highest managerial level within BMG UK, the 
appointment of a new Managing Director at the RCA label level was an important 
catalyst for the firm’s transformation. 
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 There was an obvious trigger to change from poor performance. During the 
period 1986-1988 BMG UK had experienced a significant market share decline from 
8.2% to 5.2% by 1991. The increasing emphasis on local content in the world’s music 
markets provided an opportunity for BMG to recover. Bertelsmann made BMG UK 
the overall group’s main source of repertoire. This meant that the UK had to deliver 
commercially attractive music not only to the local market, but also to other parts of 
the world covered by the International group. But with almost no experience in local 
A&R, BMG had to create new capabilities to meet such a deficit in British artist 
development. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
 The interviews revealed that the reorganization of BMG’s internal processes 
essentially happened at two different levels within the company (see Table 6). On the 
one hand, the creation of separate departments and project-based structures enabled a 
focused approach to A&R and marketing at BMG’s front-line labels. On the other 
hand, more strategic concerns that surpassed individual labels and other cross-label 
issues were made manageable through the formation of a new Music Division at the 
corporate level. Whereas the labels used to operate autonomously from each other, 
more emphasis was given to the coordination and leveraging of skills across the 
company’s front-line labels. The creation of a network of license deals, joint ventures 
and satellite labels took place at both the label and corporate levels within the 
company. In addition, the BMG Classics label was strengthened via the purchase of 
independent Conifer Records, while a new business venture was launched to enter the 
TV compilation albums market. In the process of developing such an elaborate 
organizational structure, BMG created distinct skills in managing its interface with the 
creative community, and its evolving label infrastructure enabled BMG UK to both 
access and internalize creative resources. The company’s performance improved 
rapidly from 1992 onwards, when operating losses were turned into substantial 
profits.  
 Warner Music UK had also noted a shift in consumer preferences from US-
based music to local artists. The interviews at Warner revealed that like BMG, it also 
aimed to create new capabilities by means of an organizational change trajectory (see 
Table 6). Warner’s strategic renewal was largely a corporate issue; first in terms of 
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the creation of separate label groupings, and later through the launch of “Warner.esp” 
a new division focused on compilation albums, which acted as integrator and central 
intelligence unit. During this second stage, new skills were developed to share 
knowledge across label groupings, which enhanced both label groupings’ appreciation 
for a more scientific approach to market research. Furthermore, the move into 
compilations introduced Warner to cooperative venturing with other major record 
companies. Warner Music UK thus managed to achieve integration between 
innovation and commercialization both within the firm and across its boundaries. As a 
result, both turnover and profits increased at a rapid pace between 1992 and 1996. 
 
Independents’ Response to the New Rules 
While the four major companies intensified operations to meet local independent 
competitors, independent labels began to pay more attention to international market 
opportunities. One independent company that had already developed an international 
perspective in the second half of the eighties was Roadrunner Records. It was a small 
label specialized in metal music with its home base in the Netherlands, that had 
expanded its scope towards surrounding countries (France, Germany and the UK), 
after which it set up overseas units during the nineties (Brazil, Japan and Australia). 
These foreign affiliates were primarily responsible for marketing Roadrunner’s 
largely US-based repertoire, which the label extracted from its office in New York. 
 Our interviews revealed that the appointment of a new A&R manager and 
Managing Director at the UK company, as well as a new Strategic MD at the 
International office were important catalysts to organizational change, see Table 7. 
The chairman of the company spotted an opportunity to increase Roadrunner’s base of 
international repertoire. A sudden success of one of the label’s dance acts in 1995 and 
the rising popularity of British music made him develop a vision in which Roadrunner 
Record’s historical strength in personal A&R could be combined with a move into 
other market segments. His primary aim was to convert Roadrunner into an 
international record company that would also be active in various non-metal styles of 
music with a British accent to its US-dominated repertoire. However, the company 
had to realize this new strategy. First, new A&R capabilities had to be developed. 
Second, new capabilities were needed to increase efficiency and coordination at the 
International unit level. The process of change simultaneously took place at two 
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distinct but related levels within the overall company: at the UK subsidiary and within 
Roadrunner International. 
At the UK office, reorganization took place in which new marketing and 
promotion staff was hired and the administrative function was brought in-house. In 
the Netherlands, there were new information systems that enhanced the flow of intra-
company information, and increased speed in administrative procedures. In addition, 
these departments were made responsible for the development of skills that involved 
intellectual property rights protection and cross-subsidiary coordination. The 
distribution deal with PolyGram in the UK not only assisted sales but also showed an 
increasing commitment towards a more rational business approach. At the time of 
completing our case, Roadrunner Records appeared to have made a promising start in 
integrating innovation and commercial market entry.  
  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Another internationalizing company in the independent category was Independiente. 
It aimed to create new capabilities fundamental to a new and international approach to 
its business (see Table 7). It made an international licensing deal with Sony Music 
providing access to Sony’s global distribution and marketing capability. At the same 
time, organizational processes were structured along project-based company lines 
where expertise and skills crossed functional boundaries. Formal and informal 
meetings were blended to create effective vehicles for communication and increase 
the organization’s operational efficiency. Creative action could thus take place within 
the company without obstructing a more rational business approach. In the end, 
Independiente became successful with respect to managing creativity in music and 
creativity in business at the very same time. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The empirical analysis illustrates the basic premise that search behavior drives 
coevolution. The first part of our empirical study of the music industry, the period 
1877-1990, displays how interorganizational search for capabilities at innovative 
record companies like Victor, Decca, Atlantic and Warner resulted in a competitive 
struggle at the industry level. This stimulated the search behavior of rivals that was 
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directed at the imitation of previously unknown capabilities. In addition, the multiple-
case study for the period 1990-1997 shows the firm-level point of view. It highlights 
the challenges each firm faced in trying to increase its capabilities in the two 
dimensions of commercialization and creativity. In Figure 2 we depict how the case 
companies moved towards one another as followers adapted to changes in their 
competitive environment. Independiente, for example, was originally positioned in the 
upper left corner, but moved further on the commercial business capability dimension 
by creating new capabilities in a.o. organizational coordination. As is illustrated in 
Figure 2, Island’s search behavior was essentially manipulative in character as it 
forced other rival firms to adapt to the resulting change in their competitive 
environment, and to search for new capabilities as well. These findings illustrate 
proposition 1.a and proposition 2.a on how search behavior is connected among 
firms. Innovation and imitation appears to be an important force. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
 Next, the description and analysis of the music industry suggests how 
exploration at the industry level was a matter of explorative search for distinct 
capabilities by innovators and early imitators. This was observable during the six 
regimes in Table 3. Although the data presented in the historical study does not reveal 
in-depth knowledge on the search behavior of imitators, it does indicate that early 
imitators (at least) are also involved in explorative search behavior when trying to 
replicate the innovator’s new capabilities base. This can be observed in the fact that it 
took rival record companies (such as Decca) several years before they had managed to 
erode the innovator’s competitive advantage, which reflects the strenuous nature of 
their search behavior.  
 The multiple-case study is more informative in this respect. It shows how both 
manipulators and adapters were engaged in explorative search as the studied record 
firms created new capabilities and dissociated themselves from established practice. 
Table 8 provides ample evidence to support the idea that exploration at the firm level 
was in fact the creative search for new capabilities by both manipulators and adapters. 
It focuses on the capability of A&R in the companies of Island, Virgin, BMG, and 
Warner, and on internationalization in RoadRunner and Independiente. Moreover, the 
multi-case study shows the interplay between early movers and later followers. For 
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example, Island Records appears to have been a manipulator of its environment where 
as most of the other firms in our study were early adapters. In sum, our findings echo 
the propositions 1.b and 2.b, about innovative and early imitative behavior.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
 Our story of manipulation and adaptation is not replicated across all sectors of 
the economy. For example, it is well known that in microcomputers successive waves 
of entry have displaced incumbents (D'Aveni, 1994). In contrast, incumbents in 
industries such as financial services (Hensmans et al., 2001) and in particular water 
(Baden-Fuller and Dean, 1999) overcome inertia and adapt. The co-evolution story of 
the music industry seems closer to the latter industries than the former. Whilst we do 
not give reasons as to why this is the case, our research adds a new dimension to the 
work of Henderson and Clark (1990). Although they examine technological 
trajectories, we investigate a much wider set of forces, showing a more complex 
picture.  
How is that the incumbents survive? Rival firms appear to be engaged in a 
sequence of organizational change trajectories (Craig, 1996) or strategic renewal 
journeys (Volberda et al., 2001), rather than single punctuated change processes as 
examined by Tushman and Romanelli (1985) and others. The history of the music 
industry gives many examples of this, some of which are captured in the column titled 
transformational capabilities in Table 3. For example, the text refers to the fact that 
Edison’s National Phonograph Company joined with Columbia records and undertook 
many kinds of innovations to survive Berliner’s onslaught. Another example was the 
challenge of the independents in the mid-1950s, when RCA and Decca were not able 
to conform to the new rules of the competitive game. It was only when both 
companies were acquired by Bertelsmann and Matsushita, respectively, and 
undertook a sequence of activities that they were able to regain their strength.  
In a similar manner, the multiple-case study clearly shows how record 
companies also managed to adopt a strategic choice perspective (Child 1972). As 
Table 8 shows, this enabled them to shake off old habits and routines, and to renew 
their search for novel capabilities through radical processes of organizational change, 
eventually resulting in new organization forms and business models. We again refer 
to Tables 5, 6, and 7 that describe some of the multiple steps that organizations took 
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internally. We suggest that this co-evolutionary perspective sheds new light on 
industry development. Entrepreneurial record companies with different capabilities 
introduced new competitive practices that replaced the existing business models and 
rules of the game. This not only induced explorative search at rival companies, but 
also took the industry to a next round of development or, in other words, to a new 
competitive regime. All these empirical observations illustrate propositions 1.c and 
2.c, thus suggesting that capabilities and competition coevolve over multiple 
competitive regimes and trajectories of organizational change. 
By following an industry and some of its key players we were able to see how 
new business models tracked new organizational forms, the issue highlighted in 
proposition 3. Table 4 shows two aspects of this dynamic based on our industry-
evolution study. On the one side we see the input and output dimensions of the 
business model, and on the other side we see the new organization forms. The macro 
perspective gives a general view, but does not take into account the variation between 
(and within) firms. Here, the case studies fill the gap. Tables 5 to 8 highlight aspects 
of the development of the six firms. Aspects of the changing business model are 
captured by the three dimensions of organizational changes. We suggest that the 
juxtaposition of new business models and new organizational forms is no accident, 
but rather another co-evolutionary theme. Our findings echo other work such as Djelic 
and Ainamo (1999), Koza and Lewin (1999), Webb and Pettigrew (1999), and 
Whittington et al. (1999), all empirical studies in the Organization Science special 
issue on Coevolution. 
Of course, we realize that our conceptual framework and empirical analysis 
have several important limitations. Although we discuss the co-evolutionary effects of 
external influences such as radio and the changing importance of intellectual property 
rights, we do not emphasize the institutional features of government, the structure of 
the capital markets, and national culture. These attributes may influence various 
relationships in the proposed framework. For example, Lewin et al. (1999) argue that 
specific institutional arrangements tend to enable and restrict strategic and 
organization adaptation options and will impact our framework. Like wise, 
Dijksterhuis et al. (1999) observe the importance of extra institutional environmental 
factors such as demographics, social movements, and management logic. There are 
other limitations, highlighted in our text, such as the lack of depth concerning 
managerial and organizational processes. In future research, the multi-case study 
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could focus on cognitive interaction and interpersonal networks of the top 
management of the firms involved. To enable such an analysis, however, additional 
data are needed regarding the professional background of managers and their 
networks. Moreover, the focus of attention in our framework and empirical analysis 
was on what type of capabilities are developed at firms, with only limited insight into 
how these capabilities are actually generated and refined over time. Insight into the 
refinement of capabilities is especially important since such behavior can culminate in 
the rise of core rigidities or competence traps.  
Another important issue for future research is to investigate why some new 
capabilities and organizational changes have an impact on the industry triggering 
changes in the prevailing competitive regime while others are not successful. A more 
extensive analysis of the context of the creation of new capabilities and of 
organizational change, taking into account the impact of e.g. network externalities or 
market power on the likelihood of successfully triggering changes in the existing 
competitive regime, seems a fruitful approach to further explore the reciprocal 
relationships between firm and industry levels of analysis. Related to the enabling 
impact of network externalities, a final issue for future research is undoubtedly the 
emergence of the new entrants in the music industry. Examples are Napster (in which 
Bertelsmann through BMG recently acquired a stake), Gnutella and Duet (a recently 
announced joint venture of Vivendi-Universal and Sony) that allow their users to 
swap music files for free via their Internet service. According to the Economist (2001, 
p.68) at present Napster users “constitute the largest community of music-lovers on 
earth”, numbering over 50 million registered users. These new entrants not only 
challenge incumbent firms in the music industry (the incumbents started a lawsuit 
against Napster) but might trigger new capabilities, a new competitive regime 
including new business models and new organizational forms in which for the first 
time in the history of the music industry as we have described here the consumers 
become really powerful.  
  Notwithstanding these limitations, we think our study highlights two 
important aspects of the coevolution of capabilities and competition. First, combining 
the results of the historical study with those of the multiple-case study allows us to see 
how rival firms in a competitive environment can be both different and similar to one 
another in terms of their capability bases at the same time. The industry history, 
focusing primarily at the meso-level, emphasizes similarities. It stresses the new 
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capabilities that were founded (and later on proliferated) during each competitive 
regime, and how rival firms move towards uniformity as they copied and proliferated 
capabilities tied to the extraction, development and commercialization of creative 
resources. At the same time, the multiple-case study, focusing primarily at the micro 
level, showed how different record companies displayed a significant degree of 
diversity. For example, while all of the studied companies were similar in their aim to 
converge creative music with commercial business (in line with the new competitive 
rules as initially pioneered by one of them), each of them pursued a different search 
route. The basic features of the organizational change trajectories followed by the 
case companies show substantial variation in terms of market positioning, capability 
development, organizational realignment, and the learning of new skills. As time 
passed, these initial differences were amplified through exploitative search, which 
increased individual firm idiosyncrasy (McKelvey, 1997). Thus, based upon historical 
and multiple-case research into the music industry, and in line with the integrative 
framework, this suggests that coevolution of capabilities and competition embodies 
multi-level but counter-moving patterns of firm uniformity and idiosyncrasy. 
Secondly, we would like to point out that interaction patterns among rivals and 
path dependencies at individual firms can have both a positive and a negative impact 
on the development of new capabilities. Interactive behavior through acquisitions, 
joint ventures and strategic alliances among record companies speeded up the 
capability development process at these firms. Although this was beneficial to the 
individual firms in their struggle to conform to the new competitive rules, it also 
pushed the industry into more intense levels of competition. In a similar vein, the 
existence of path dependencies due to long-term commitments and excessive learning 
effects slowed, but did not stop, processes of change in times of competitive 
turbulence. Our firms were able to break free from competence traps and even 
profited from their unique history by retaining its positive virtues and integrating them 
into new entrepreneurial actions. In sum, coevolution stems from endogenous 
interaction patterns, between the search for capabilities and competition, and displays 
alternating forces of maturity and rejuvenation at firm and industry. 
To conclude, we think this study fits within Lewin and Volberda's suggested 
Prolegomena on Coevolution (1999). Although they argued that populations of 
organizations undergoing discontinuous change should become the focal object of 
coevolutionary studies (e.g. retailing, financial services, biotechnology, and 
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multimedia), we think our study of the music industry shows some interesting 
dynamics. The co-evolutionary perspective allowed us to both integrate old streams of 
ideas, and to thread new ones, that seems ideal for application to complex industries. 
Old ideas such as evolution of capabilities and competition were enhanced by the co-
evolutionary approach. New ideas such as the co-development of organizational form 
and business model, still in their infancy in the literature, were brought on further. 
Messy industries such as music, vitally important in the knowledge-based economy, 
are we suggest excellent platforms relevant for further exploration. 
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TABLE 1: CASE STUDY RECORD COMPANIES  
 
 Case 
Category 
Formal 
Owner 
Date of 
Incorporation 
Number of 
Employees 
UK Market 
Share 
Island Records Acquired 
independent 
PolyGram 1962 62 2.0 (1.4-2.6) 
Virgin Records Acquired 
independent 
EMI 1973 161 8.5 (6.4-10.7) 
BMG 
International 
UK 
Major 
operating 
company 
Bertelsmann 1980 303 6.4 (4.7-8.3) 
Warner Music 
UK 
Major 
operating 
company 
Time-Warner 1970 330 10.4 (7.2-12.6) 
Roadrunner 
Records 
Independent Private 1987 7 (120) 0.1 (0.1-0.2) 
Independiente Independent Private 1983/1996 17 (19) 0.9 (0.2-1.5) 
 
Notes: 
(1) Incorporation refers to date of establishment in the UK. 
(2) UK Market Share refers to the annual averages for the period 1990-1997; figures between 
brackets are highest and lowest values in this period. 
(3) The figures between brackets in the Employees column are worldwide ones. 
(4) In May 1998, Philips sold PolyGram for an amount of $10.4 billion to Seagram that aimed to 
integrate the company with Universal. 
(5) Independiente was formerly known as Go! Discs (which explains for the two dates of 
incorporation); UK market shares therefore concern the Go! Discs label in the period 1990-
1996. 
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TABLE 2: CLASSIFYING COMPETITIVE REGIMES IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: 1877-1990 
 
Regime Basic Product Target Market Company Value 
Point 
Carrier 
Technology 
Technology logic 
(early 1900s) 
Gramophone 
cabinets 
Market for home 
entertainment 
Separate 
recording and 
manufacturing 
Drums/Disc 
system 
Software shift 
(mid 1910s) 
Gramophone 
records 
Market for 
musical variety 
Batch-based 
capacity 
production 
Disc system 
Star system  
(mid 1930s) 
Music recorded 
by celebrity artists 
Market for mass 
entertainment 
Scale-based 
marketing and 
distribution 
Radio 
Alternative music 
(mid 1950s) 
Music recorded 
by alternative 
artists 
 
Youth market 
segments 
A & R integrated 
with flexible 
distribution 
Vinyl record  
Tape recording 
Federal system 
(late 1960s) 
Music as social 
awareness 
 
Multi-market 
segments 
Label autonomy 
and HQ control 
Tape cassette 
Rights shifts 
(mid 1980s) 
Music as property 
right 
Global multi-
media markets 
Chain cooperation 
and publishing 
Compact disc 
 
Source: Huygens (1999) 
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TABLE 3 COMPETITIVE REGIMES AND THEIR RELEVANT CAPABILITIES FOUNDATION 
 
Competitive 
regime 
Managerial 
Capabilities  
Input-Based 
Capabilities  
Transformation-Based 
Capabilities  
Output-Based 
Capabilities  
Technology 
logic 
 Market for home 
entertainment 
 Availability of 
minimum software 
 High fidelity of 
recordings 
 Horizontal disc 
technology 
 Zinc masterplate for 
recording 
 Financial and 
technological 
knowledge 
 Structured firm 
organization 
 Efficient manufacturing 
plant 
 Separate recording and 
production  
 Quality 
gramophone disc 
 Technology license 
agreements 
 International 
strategic alliance 
Software shift  Market for music 
recordings 
 Availability of 
minimum hardware 
 Theatre and opera 
performers 
 Technological skills 
and experience 
 Innovation in 
recording/manufacturing 
 Capacity-based 
production 
 High release 
variety in 
recordings 
 High technological 
status 
Star system  Consumer 
preference for 
celebrities 
 Manipulation of 
consumer taste 
 Compact roster of 
celebrities 
 Marketing and 
promotion budgets 
 Avant-garde marketing 
campaigns 
 Economic rationale of 
costs vs. revenues 
 Network of 
distribution 
channels 
 Network of 
jukebox contracts 
Alternative 
music 
 Upcoming popular 
youth market 
 Continuous 
generation of new 
music 
 High market 
responsiveness 
 Roster of unproven 
and popular artists 
 Low-cost recording 
studios 
 All-round skills of 
owner/manager 
 Talent discovery and 
development 
 Entrepreneurial 
management 
 Label culture of musical 
innovation 
 Independent 
distribution 
network 
 Network of local 
radio contacts 
 Label reputation 
Federal system  Multiple market 
coverage 
 Synergy across 
focused labels 
 Collection of acquired 
record labels  
 Headquarters’ 
corporate knowledge 
 Label autonomy in A&R 
and marketing  
 Shared administration 
and P&D set-up 
 High musical 
variety in album 
releases 
 Popular corporate 
image 
Rights shift  Cultivation of 
music property 
rights 
 Multiple-time 
buyers of music  
 
 Multinational 
distribution networks 
 Scale-based CD 
manufacturing plants 
 Cooperation within value 
chain 
 Specialization of artist 
development 
Expansion of record 
catalogues 
Network of deals 
with independents 
 
Source: Huygens (1999) 
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TABLE 4: COMPETITIVE REGIMES, BUSINESS MODELS & NEW ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 
 
Competitive 
regime 
Changing Industry Business models Changing 
Organizational Forms 
 Input-Market  
Activities 
Output-Market 
Activities 
 
 
Technology logic 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Software shift From theatre artists to 
anonymous performers 
 
From standard cabinets to 
target models 
From technology start-
up to record company 
Star system From contracting artists 
to developing stars 
 
From billboard to radio 
and movie promotion 
From small company to 
corporate bureaucracy 
Alternative music From artist discovery to 
image building 
 
From local to network 
radio & TV promotion 
From A&R individuals 
to A&R departments 
Federal system From artist variety to 
overproduction 
 
From sales promotion to 
elaborated marketing 
From multiple labels to 
foreign subsidiaries 
Rights shift From music artists to 
entertainment stars 
 
From local to global 
multi-media networks 
From record company 
to music company 
 
Source: Adapted from Huygens (1999) 
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TABLE 5: CONTEXT, CONTENT AND PROCESS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AT 
ACQUIRED INDEPENDENTS 
 
 Island Records Virgin Records 
Context   
New executives Appointment of a new Managing Director Formation of new three-headed 
management team 
New ownership PolyGram’s £272 million acquisition of 
Island 
Thorn-EMI’s £560 million 
acquisition of Virgin 
Threat/opportunity Competition focused on catalogue and 
mainstream pop 
No competition for new music 
on a global level 
Performance 
decline 
Rapid decrease of company market share 
over 1989 
Sudden decrease of company 
market share in 1991 
   
Content   
Vision Merge Island’s musical past with future 
commercial demands 
Merge Virgin’s entrepreneurial 
past with future global demands 
Scope Introduce new music/artists to a wide 
audience 
Deliver new music/artists to a 
worldwide audience 
Positioning Island as a commercially alternative record 
label 
Virgin as an internationally 
focused record company  
Capabilities Rebirth/formation of A&R and marketing 
caps 
Convergence of new A&R and 
marketing capabilities 
   
Process   
New philosophy Discover high-quality repertoire with 
commercial potential 
Discover alternative repertoire 
with global potential 
Reorganization Structure with new A&R and marketing staff 
at top and front-line positions 
Internal network of 
divisionalized sub labels 
Internal ventures Launch of internal legal and business affairs 
department 
Launch of alternative and dance 
departments 
New alliances - - 
Status re-evaluation Declining influence of founder Blackwell on 
label strategy  
Increasing attention to research-
based marketing 
Learning new skills Marketing new and alternative music 
(genres) 
Coordinating creative and 
planning functions 
Resolving 
dilemmas 
Innovation in and commercialisation of 
music 
Diversity in A&R and targeted 
marketing 
 
Source: Huygens (1999) 
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TABLE 6: CONTEXT, CONTENT AND PROCESS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AT MAJORS 
 
 BMG International UK Warner Music UK 
Context   
New executives Appointment of a new RCA 
Managing Director 
Appointment of new WEA MD and 
new Warner.esp GM 
New ownership - - 
Threat/opportunity Increase in consumer attention for 
local content 
Increase in consumer attention for 
local content 
Performance decline Significant decrease of company 
market share 1989-1991 
- 
   
Content   
Vision Merge Bertelsmann’s management 
ethos with local market demands 
Merge Warner’s traditional marketing 
approach with local market demands 
Scope Deliver commercial artists to 
international audience 
Deliver commercial artists to UK 
audience 
Positioning BMG UK as internationally-
oriented local record corporation 
Warner UK as locally-oriented 
American record corporation 
Capabilities Incorporation of local A&R 
capabilities 
Coordination and development of 
A&R capabilities 
   
Process   
New philosophy Build local repertoire to be 
leveraged internationally 
Build local repertoire to be leverage 
via catalogue exploitation 
Reorganization Music Division at corporate level; 
projects and departments at label 
level 
Separate label groupings (WEA and 
East West) and Warner.esp 
Internal ventures Launch of satellite labels and 
Global TV 
Launch of TV compilations division 
New alliances Various license deals and joint 
ventures 
Various license deals and JVs at 
labels; compilation alliances 
Status re-evaluation Increasing attention to cross-label 
coordination 
Increasing attention to systematic 
market analysis 
Learning new skills  Managing a network of interfaces 
with the creative community 
Sharing of company knowledge 
across label groupings 
Resolving dilemmas Access to and internalisation of 
creative resources 
Competition and cooperation at intra- 
and inter-firm levels 
 
Source: Huygens (1999) 
 53
TABLE 7: CONTEXT, CONTENT AND PROCESS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AT 
INDEPENDENTS 
 
 Roadrunner Records Independiente 
Context   
New executives Appointment of a new MD and 
A&R manager at UK; new Strat. 
MD at International 
- 
New ownership - PolyGram’s estimated £20 million 
purchase of 51% of Go! Discs 
Threat/opportunity Increase in consumer attention for 
British music 
Increase in consumer attention for 
innovative music on an international 
level 
Performance decline - - 
   
Content   
Vision Merge Roadrunner’s traditional 
A&R approach with diverse market 
demands 
Merge Go! Discs A&R history with 
international alternative market 
demands 
Scope Deliver UK artists to international 
audience 
Deliver creative artists to 
international audience 
Positioning Roadrunner as internationally-
oriented diversified record label 
Independiente internationally 
alternative record label 
Capabilities Creation of A&R and coordination 
capabilities  
Incorporation of international and 
commercial capabilities  
   
Process   
New philosophy Build diverse repertoire to be 
leveraged internationally 
Discover high-quality repertoire with 
international potential  
Reorganization Staff reshuffle in UK office; new IT 
systems at International 
Temporary and cross-functional 
project teams 
Internal ventures - Launch of New York office 
New alliances UK distribution agreement with 
PolyGram 
UK distribution and international 
licensing deal with Sony 
Status re-evaluation Increasing status of administrative 
and legal affairs departments 
Increasing appreciation for creative 
action within a business setting 
Learning new skills  Intra-company knowledge sharing; 
property rights protection 
Effective and efficient 
communication via meetings 
Resolving dilemmas Local A&R and international 
coordination 
Creativity in music and creativity in 
business  
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Source: Huygens (1999) 
TABLE 8: NEW CAPABILITIES AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
 
 Capabilities * Organizational change ** 
Island Formation of A&R and marketing Major vs indie staff at top vs front-line 
positions 
Virgin Convergence of A&R and 
marketing  
Internal network of divisionalized sub 
labels 
BMG Incorporation of local A&R Music division of project-based 
frontline labels 
Warner Formation and coordination of 
A&R 
Central division between separate label 
groupings 
Roadrunner Creation of multinational 
coordination 
IT-oriented headquarters with local 
units 
Independiente Development of international base Temporary and cross-functional project 
teams 
 
Source: Table 5,6 and 7 
* ) This column provides examples of new capabilities stemming from several capability categories. 
See for a more complete description Tables 5 – 7. 
** ) This column summarizes only one attribute of the process dimension of organizational change. See 
for other attributes Tables 5 – 7. 
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FIGURE 1: AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF COEVOLUTION OF CAPABILITIES AND 
COMPETITION  
 
*) The numbers 1.a-1.c, 2.a-2.c and 3 refer to the corresponding propositions, see the text. 
Industry 
level 
Firm 
level 
2.a 
1.b 1.cInterorganizational
search behavior 
Competitive  
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Innovation-Imitation 
Process of  
Manipulation-Adaptation 
COEVOLUTION: 
New Business models 
New Organization Forms 
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 FIGURE 2: THE DYNAMIC OF MANIPULATION AND ADAPTATION, 1990-1997 
 
 
Source: Huygens (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 57
Publications in the Report Series Research in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Strategy and Entrepreneurship” 
 
2001 
 
Organisational Path-Dependence and Institutional Environment: The Case of East Asia’s Chinese Family 
Business Groups 
Michael Carney & Eric Gedajlovic 
ERS-2001-07-STR 
 
Institutional Change and Firm Adaptation: Toward a Typoloy of Southeast Asian Corporate Forms 
Michael Carney & Eric Gedajlovic 
ERS-2001-08-STR 
 
Ownership Structure, Investment Behavior and Firm Performance in Japanese Manufacturing Industries 
Eric R. Gedajlovic, Toru Yoshikawa & Motomi Hashimoto 
ERS-2001-09-STR 
 
Setting up a Business in the Netherlands: Who starts, Who gives up, Who is still trying? 
Marco van Gelderen, Niels Bosma & Roy Thurik 
ERS-2001-15-STR 
 
Networks in Entrepreneurship: The Case of High-Technology Firms 
Tom Elfring & Willem Hulsink 
ERS- 2001-28-STR 
 
A Note on Entrepreneurship, Small Business and Economic Growth 
ERS-2001-60-STR 
Roy Thurik & Sander Wennekers 
 
Coevolution of Firm Capabilities and Industry Competition: Investigating the Music Industry 1877-1977 
ERS-2001-61-STR 
Marc Huygens, Charles Baden-Fuller, Frans A.j. van den Bosch & Henk W. Volberda 
 
 
2000 
 
Start-Up Capital: Differences Between Male and Female Entrepreneurs, ‘Does Gender Matter?’  
Ingrid Verheul & Roy Thurik 
ERS-2000-07-STR 
 
Strategies, Uncertainty and Performance of Small Business Startups 
Marco van Gelderen, Michael Frese & Roy Thurik 
ERS-2000-18-STR 
 
Creation of Managerial Capabilities through Managerial Knowledge Integration: a Competence-Based Perspective 
Frans A.J. van den Bosch & Raymond van Wijk 
ERS-2000-19-STR 
 
                                                           
  A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
http://www.ers.erim.eur.nl 
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing  
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
  
Transition Processes towards Internal Networks: Differential Paces of Change and Effects on Knowledge Flows at 
Rabobank Group 
Raymond A. van Wijk & Frans A.J. van den Bosch 
ERS-2000-22-STR 
 
Creating the N-Form Corporation as a Managerial Competence 
Raymond vanWijk & Frans A.J. van den Bosch 
ERS-2000-24-STR 
 
Competition and Market Dynamics on the Russian Deposits Market 
Piet-Hein Admiraal & Martin A. Carree 
ERS-2000-25-STR 
 
Interest and Hazard Rates of Russian Saving Banks 
Martin A. Carree 
ERS-2000-26-STR 
 
The Evolution of the Russian Saving Bank Sector during the Transition Era 
Martin A. Carree 
ERS-2000-27-STR 
 
New Entrants versus Incumbents in the Emerging On-Line Financial Services Complex 
Manuel Hensmans, Frans A.J. van den Bosch &  Henk W. Volberda 
ERS-2000-41-STR 
 
What’s New about the New Economy? Sources of Growth in the Managed and Entrepreneurial Economies 
David B. Audretsch and A. Roy Thurik 
ERS-2000-45-STR 
 
 
 ii
